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No. 98-18, 1999 WL 10073
(4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999)
L Facts'
Leroy Joseph Drayton was convicted and sentenced to death by a
South Carolina jury for the 1984 kidnaping, armed robbery, and murder of
Rhonda Smith.2 The South Carolina Supreme Court vacated Drayton's
conviction, and, at his second trial, he was once again convicted and sen-
tenced to death.3 After the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction and sentence, Drayton filed a petition for state habeas relief,
which was denied. Subsequently, he filed a habeas petition in federal court,
which also was denied.'
On appeal, Drayton asserted several claims. He argued that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") at both the guilt phase and the
sentencing phase.' First, he claimed that his trial counsel erred by failing to
present evidence of his relationship with the victim, Rhonda Smith.6 He
also claimed that his trial counsel erred by failing "to contest the forensic
evidence."' With respect to his counsel's penalty phase performance,
Drayton contended that his counsel should have done the following: (1)
presented evidence regarding his adaptability to prison; (2) requested an
instruction that the jury should give the term "life imprisonment" its
ordinary meaning" and not consider the possibility of parole in issuing a
sentence recommendation; and (3) investigated Drayton's "mental state,
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 168 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Drayton v. Moore, No. 98-18, 1999 WL 10073, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999).
According to the facts set forth by the court of appeals, Drayton abducted Smith from the
gas station at which she worked, forced Smith to drive the two of them for a little while, and
then returned to the station with Smith. Upon returning to the station, Smith apparently
waited on customers. Drayton then abducted Smith for a second time, and the two of them
went to an abandoned coal trestle, where Drayton claimed (through his confession) that he




6. Id., at *2.
7. Id.
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alcohol and substance abuse, learning disabilities, and hypoglycemia."'
Finally, Drayton argued that he had received ineffective assistance on the
basis of his counsel's faulty closing argument.9
Drayton asserted several other claims on appeal which were unrelated
to his 1AC claims.1" He contended that the district court should have
granted him an evidentiary hearing on any one of his claims.11 He claimed
that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was questioned by
police in the absence of counsel after making a request for counsel at his
bond hearing.12 He claimed that the police violated Miranda v. Arizona 3 in
questioning him and obtaining his confession after giving him erroneous
Miranda instructions.14 He also claimed that the police violated Michigan v.
Mosley"5 in continuing to question him after he had requested the presence
of counsel. 6 Additionally, he argued that the trial judge erred in the follow-
ing two ways: (1) by declining to give the jury an instruction on manslaugh-
ter; and (2) by instructing the jury so as to lead it to believe that unanimity
was required with respect to mitigating circumstances." Finally, Drayton
claimed that the state supreme court's failure to conduct proportionality
review, as required under South Carolina law, denied him due process. 8
8. Id., at *2-3.
9. Id., at *3.
10. Id., at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id., at *4.
13. 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966) (holding that "if a person in custody is to be subjected
to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right
to remain silent .... [that] anything said can and will be used against the individual in court,"
and that he has a right to have counsel present).
14. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *5.
15. 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (citation omitted) (holding that "the admissibility of
statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under
Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored'").
16. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *5. According to the majority, "[p]olice first adminis-
tered the warnings when they arrested Drayton on February 16, 1984, between 7:30 and 8:00
a.m. When Drayton exercised his right to remain silent, the questioning stopped. Police
administered a second set of warnings several hours later at headquarters. Again, when
Drayton chose to remain silent, the police suspended their questioning. Finally, after
Drayton had returned from his bond hearing and asked to speak with Lieutenant Frazier, an
officer with whom he had had prior contact, Frazier administered a third set of warnings."
Id., at *6. However, as the dissent noted, the evidence indicated that Drayton invoked his
right to remain silent twice before his bond hearing, communicated at the hearing that he
intended to retain his own attorney, and after the hearing, asked to speak to Frazier only
when he overheard Frazier's "familiar" voice while he (Drayton) was being interrogated by
two police officers. Id., at *8-9.





The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
defense counsel's failure to present evidence of Drayton's relationship with
the victim did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under Strick-
land v. Washington'9 but, instead, constituted a "reasonable strategic
choice."2" The court summarily dismissed Drayton's IAC claim regarding
the forensic evidence as procedurally barred.2 With respect to Drayton's
penalty phase IAC claims, the court determined that Drayton failed to make
the two-pronged showing required by Strickland.22 Specifically, the court
held that defense counsel's failure to present evidence regarding Drayton's
adaptability to prison was a "strategic calculation."23 In addition, the court
held that defense counsel's decision not to seek the instruction regarding life
imprisonment and parole constituted a "reasoned strategic decision." 24 With
respect to defense counsel's failure to investigate possible mitigating circum-
stances, including Drayton's "mental state, alcohol and substance abuse,
learning disabilities, and hypoglycemia," the court held that defense coun-
sel's performance was not "unreasonable" and not violative of the Strickland
standard.2' The court dismissed Drayton's claim that his counsel's closing
argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel by stating that even
"assuming deficient performance," Drayton had failed to meet the prejudice
prong of the Strickland standard. Finally, the court rejected Drayton's
contention that "the cumulative effect of the bad decisions by his lawyer
constituted ineffective assistance," finding that he failed on both prongs of
the Strickland standard.26
The court rejected all of Drayton's other claims, as well. The court
found that Drayton was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the
record indicated that he had received a "full and fair hearing in state court."2
The court, crediting the trial court's finding that Drayton had not requested
the appointment of counsel, held that the police's questioning of Drayton,
despite the absence of counsel, did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights.2"
The court rejected both of Drayton's Miranda claims, finding that the
19. 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (holding that to obtain reversal of a conviction or death
sentence on the basis of counsel's performance, a defendant must show (1) "that counsel's
performance was deficient" and (2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense").
20. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *2.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 19.




27. Id., at *6.
28. Id., at *4-5.
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element of the instructions rendering them faulty was "inconsequential" and
that because the police officers issued Miranda warnings to Drayton each
time they resumed questioning, they had not violated the dictates of
Miranda." The court deemed Drayton's claim regarding the trial court's
failure to give an instruction on manslaughter to be procedurally barred.0
The court also rejected as procedurally barred Drayton's claim regarding the
jury's potential belief, due to faulty instructions, that unanimity was re-
quired with respect to mitigating circumstances." Finally, the court upheld
the lower court's finding that the state supreme court had properly con-
ducted its proportionality review. 2
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Providing Effective Assistance of Counsel in the
Fourth Circuit and in Reality
1. The Court's Facile Strickland "Analysis"
In a nutshell, the court engaged in a cynical and conclusory analysis of
virtually all of Drayton's IAC claims. The court transformed defense
counsel's failures into strategic decisions with little, if any, pretense of
analysis. For example, the court excused defense counsel's failure to intro-
duce evidence of Drayton's relationship with the victim by citing defense
counsel's desire to take an approach different from that employed at the first
trial-namely, "to avoid placing Drayton at the crime scene altogether.""
The court continued, "[defense counsel] took this approach because he
believed that Drayton's confession could be excluded and that, without the
confession, the state had only a circumstantial case." 4 This disingenuous
analysis ignores the fact that at the time of the trial-presumably after the
29. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *5-6.
30. Id., at *7. The court indicated that even if the claim had not been procedurally
barred, the court would have agreed with the district court that the instruction at issue was
not supported by the record. Id., at *6.
31. Id., at *7. The court also found that the claim would fail on the merits were it not
procedurally barred. Id.
32. Id., at *8. The court also noted that "[iln any case, such a claim is insufficient to
merit granting the writ." Id.
This summary will address only those aspects of the opinion which relate to the
defense counsel's performance-specifically, his failure to investigate-and the defendant's
rights to have counsel and to remain silent. It will not address the other claims asserted by
the defendant, for such claims generally turn upon the specific details of individual cases, and
the court provided very little detail with respect to nature or merit of the other claims
asserted by Drayton.
33. Id., at *2. Drayton also told counsel of an incident where he had protected Smith
from some drug dealers. Without comment or critique, the court answered that counsel
decided it would be too difficult to track down witnesses to the incident. Id., at *2 n.1.
34. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *2.
[Vol. 11:2
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suppression hearing had taken place-defense counsel knew that evidence of
the confession would be introduced at trial by the prosecution. The court
followed this analysis with a conclusory analysis of the prejudice prong,
determining that because Drayton had made prior statements which denied
a relationship with Smith and because his first trial, "at which evidence of
his relationship with Smith was introduced, resulted in a conviction and a
death sentence," Drayton's claim necessarily failed.3"
The court's refusal to consider properly Drayton's IAC claims was
most apparent in its analysis of defense counsel's failure to investigate
Drayton's "mental state, alcohol and substance abuse, learning disabilities,
and hypoglycemia."36 Devoting a mere four sentences to the claim, the
court began by simply crediting defense counsel's testimony that he wished
"to present Drayton in a 'positive' light," as if that testimony bore some
relevance to his failure to investigate possible lines of mitigation.3" The
court continued, "[defense counsel] believed he had a very good jury for his
client, and he said that he didn't want to 'rock the boat' with negative
testimony."" Again, the court did not explain how that belief justified
defense counsel's failure to investigate possible lines of mitigation and
discover what kinds of evidence and testimony he might be able to present.
Finally, the court concluded, "[g]iven the circumstances of this case, we
cannot say that this approach was unreasonable."
39
2. Beyond the Fourth Circuit: What Strickland Really Means
In this case, the Strickland standard for effective assistance of counsel
required defense counsel at a minimum to investigate possible lines of
mitigation before making any strategic decisions about what types of evi-
dence to present at either the guilt phase or the penalty phase. The Court
stated, "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation. "40 Thus, as Strickland's language
clearly indicates, the Supreme Court contemplated that strategic decisions
would and could be deemed reasonable or unreasonable only insofar as the
predicate decision to investigate or not to investigate is judged to be reason-
able.41
In Drayton, defense counsel failed to investigate and thus present
evidence of Drayton's "mental state, alcohol and substance abuse, learning
35. Id.








disabilities, and hypoglycemia." The court's summary approval of that
failure, which it countenanced as a "strategic" decision, defies logic and
should not serve as a guide to any capital defense attorney seeking to pro-
vide effective assistance of counsel to his or her client. No capital defense
attorney could properly make a strategic decision about whether to present
evidence concerning a defendant's mental state, alcohol and substance abuse,
learning disabilities, or health without first conducting an investigation to
discover what that evidence would be. Thus, while the court's decision in
this case may demonstrate how very little competence the Fourth Circuit
will demand from capital defense attorneys, again, it should not be inter-
preted as a credible explanation or definition of what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel.
B. Preserving Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights
1. The Dissent's Analysis
The dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that the police officers
complied with the dictates of the Sixth Amendment when they continued
to interrogate Drayton after he had invoked his rights to remain silent and
retain his own attorney. The dissent explained that once Drayton invoked
his rights to remain silent and to retain his own attorney, the police should
not have continued to question him unless he initiated such contact.42 In
determining that the police officers had not violated Drayton's right to
counsel, the majority focused upon the fact that Drayton allegedly "initi-
ated" contact with the police (Officer Frazier) when he was being interro-
gated by two police officers. The dissent contended that his request to speak
with Officer Frazier, in that context, did not constitute an "initiation" for
purposes of analyzing whether he had waived his rights because he was in
the midst of undergoing a plainly unlawful interrogation at the time he
noticed Officer Frazier.43
2. Towards Remaining Silent
Although Drayton would have been back in his cell and never seen
Officer Frazier had the police been acting lawfully, his case highlights the
need to make every effort to protect clients from making statements to the
police. The practical realities of capital cases demand that defense counsel
work hard to ensure that defendants remain silent from the outset. A
capital defendant triggers these constitutional protections by declaring
clearly, "I want a lawyer."" He or she should follow this declaration with
42. Drayton, 1999 WL 10073, at *9-11.
43. Id., at * 11- 12.
44. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994) (holding that suspect who
[Vol. 11:2
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silence and should remain quiet in the face of repeated interrogation. The
theoretical possibility of suppressing a wrongfully obtained confession,
because it is so slim, cannot justify anything less than absolute vigilance in
protecting a defendant's right to remain silent and ensuring that the defen-
dant actually exercise that right by being quiet.
The importance of keeping a capital defendant quiet stems from the
reality that confessions which might be suppressed in other contexts because
they were obtained in a manner contrary to the Constitution will almost
always be somehow admitted in capital trials, simply because the trials are
capital, if the confessions constitute an integral part of the prosecution's
case. For example, Drayton's trial counsel contended, in the present case,
that the prosecution's case was weak without the confession. If he was
correct, the trial court's admission of the confession is understandable, albeit
not justified. It is, in any event, typical of the treatment of suppression
issues in Virginia.4"
Anne E. Duprey
"unambiguously requests counsel" has a right to be free from continued questioning "regard-
ing any offense unless an attorney is actually present").
45. See generally Cherrix v. Commonwealth, Nos. 981798, 982063, 1999 WL 101077
(Va. Feb. 26, 1999); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998); Green v. Com-
monwealth, 500 S.E.2d 835 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98 (Va.
1996).
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